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NEURO LIE DETECTION AND MENTAL PRIVACY
MADISON KILBRIDE * & JASON IULIANO †
ABSTRACT
New technologies inevitably raise novel legal questions. This is
particularly true of technologies, such as neuro lie detection, that
offer new ways to investigate crime. Recently, a number of
scholars have asked whether neuro lie detection testing is constitutional. So far, the debate has focused on the Fifth Amendment—specifically whether evidence gathered through neuro lie
detection is constitutionally admissible because it is “physical”
in nature or inadmissible because it is “testimonial” in nature.
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, this Fifth Amendment debate is intractable. However, the more fundamental question of
whether the government can compel individuals to undergo a
neuro lie detection test does have a clear answer. It just so happens that the answer lies in the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth.
In this Paper, we argue that forcing a criminal defendant, or any
other person, to submit to a neuro lie detection test is a substantial invasion of mental privacy that is unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The success of any judicial system is predicated on the ability of judges and jurors to distinguish truths from lies. Given that humans are highly
fallible in this regard, there is immense interest in developing a scientific
technique that reliably detects deception. Currently, the polygraph examination is the most widely used form of scientific lie detection. However,
given its lack of accuracy, few U.S. jurisdictions allow polygraph evidence
to be admitted in court.1 At present, new techniques and technologies are
being developed to fill this void by providing a scientifically valid and accurate method of lie detection. Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(“fMRI”) is one technology that may have the potential to help the legal
system decipher truths from lies.
An fMRI is a neural imaging procedure that measures brain activity by
observing changes in blood flow. More specifically, the technology detects
the delivery of oxygenated blood to neurons that have just fired. In this
way, fMRI helps researchers understand which parts of the brain respond to
particular stimuli. In clinical settings, it has a broad range of applications.
For instance, fMRI has already been used to plan neurosurgical procedures,
diagnose psychiatric disorders, and examine the effects of drugs and behavioral therapy.
Given the potential uses of fMRI in legal proceedings, several commercial firms have already begun marketing this technology for its lie detection capabilities. One of the major companies in the field, No Lie MRI,
boasts an accuracy rate over ninety percent. 2 Even though some scientists
have expressed skepticism about the validity of this claim, 3 it is easy to see
how the technology could have widespread applications in criminal and civil cases.
With these recent advances in neuro lie detection, it is not surprising
that academics have already begun to ask whether the use of such technologies in legal proceedings would be constitutionally permissible. Thus far,
the debate has centered on the question of whether compelling a criminal
defendant to submit to a neuro lie detection test is a violation of the Fifth
1. Nineteen states allow the admission of polygraph results when both parties consent. Only New Mexico permits the introduction of polygraph results under its regular evidentiary rules.
Legal Admissibility of Polygraph Test Results, MATTE POLYGRAPH SERV.,
http://www.mattepolygraph.com/legal_admissibility.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015).
2. See Product Overview, NO LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm
(last visited Sept. 15,2 2015) (“Current accuracy is over 90% and is estimated to be 99% once
product development is complete.”).
3. See Alexis Madrigal, MRI Lie Detection to Get First Day in Court, WIRED (MAR. 16,
2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/03/noliemri/ (noting that “some scientists and lawyers . . . doubt that [fMRI lie detection] results will prove replicable outside the lab setting, and
others say it just isn’t ready yet.”).
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Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Although this question is
an interesting one, at present, it is intractable.
The central point of contention in the Fifth Amendment debate is
whether evidence gathered from neuro lie detection is “physical”—and,
therefore, constitutionally admissible—or “testimonial”—and, therefore,
inadmissible. Scholars on both sides of the discussion have developed persuasive arguments to support their positions. 4 Because neuro lie detection
is qualitatively different from any traditional form of evidence, existing
court doctrine simply does not provide sufficient guidance to settle the Fifth
Amendment issue. As things stand, the physical-testimonial debate is unresolvable.
Nonetheless, the question of whether it is constitutionally permissible
to compel a criminal defendant to undergo a neuro lie detection test can be
answered. In this Paper, we advance the conversation by shifting focus
from the Fifth Amendment to the Fourth Amendment. That maneuver has
two key benefits. First, it moves us away from the intractable physicaltestimonial dispute by recasting the problem as an issue of mental privacy
and human dignity. Second, it expands the scope of the debate. To date,
the discussion has focused solely on criminal defendants. However, there is
another group of individuals who would be likely subjects of governmentcompelled neuro lie detection tests. That group is witnesses.
We believe that there is something fundamentally wrong with forcing
witnesses—who are often innocent bystanders and sometimes victims
themselves—to submit to a procedure that invades their mental privacy to
such a substantial degree. Unfortunately, the current discourse says nothing
about whether the government could force a witness to submit to a neuro lie
detection test. Unlike criminal defendants, witnesses are generally unable
to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, any objection must be founded upon another constitutional provision.
In this Paper, we lay out the basis for an argument that derives its support from the Fourth Amendment. We argue that compelled neuro lie detection infringes upon a witness’s right to mental privacy and, in doing so,
undermines that person’s human dignity. Our Fourth Amendment analysis
also resolves the question of whether a criminal defendant can be forced to
take a neuro lie detection test—something the Fifth Amendment debate is
unable to do. Because the constitution grants criminal defendants the same
degree of dignity and respect that is accorded to all persons, the State may
not force defendants to submit to such tests either. By setting aside the
Fifth Amendment issue and focusing the debate on a more fundamental
constitutional principle, we are able to make progress on this formerly intractable problem.
4. See infra Part II.
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In Part I of this Paper, we discuss recent advances in neuro lie detection. In Part II, we examine the current debate about whether forcing a defendant to undergo a neuro lie detection test violates his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, in Part III, we refocus the debate by considering the issue as applied to witnesses. Ultimately, we argue
that the State cannot force anyone—defendant or witness—to submit to
neuro lie detection testing. To do so would be to violate a person’s Fourth
Amendment right to mental privacy and the associated constitutional guarantee of human dignity.
I. RECENT ADVANCES IN NEURO LIE DETECTION
Before fMRI became the dominant technology in deception research,
neuroscientists used scalp-recorded event-related potentials (“ERPs”) to
study changes in electrical activity in the brain in response to external stimuli. 5 ERPs are measured by electroencephalography (“EEG”), which detects electrical activity in the brain by attaching electrodes to the scalp.
While ERPs are a direct measure of brain activity, “their source in the brain
cannot be uniquely localized.” 6 Thus, although an EEG can tell researchers
whether there is more or less brain activity in response to a mental process,
it is silent on which brain regions are active. fMRI solves the localization
problem by enabling neuroscientists to identify and localize the brain regions involved in different mental processes, including deception. While
the details are complicated, the basic idea is straightforward. fMRI is able
to measure brain activity by detecting changes in cerebral blood flow. 7 Because cerebral blood flow and neuronal activation are coupled, when a region of the brain is in use, blood flow to that region increases.
A. Experiments
In the first peer-reviewed and published report on the use of fMRI to
study deception, experimenters used a modified version of what is known
as the Guilty Knowledge Test (“GKT”). 8 This test can be used during a
polygraph interrogation to test the accused on elements of a crime that
could only be known by the guilty party. Typically, questions are presented
in multiple-choice format (as opposed to a polygraph examination which
5. For a comprehensive explanation of event-related potentials, see STEVEN J. LUCK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE 1–48 (2005).
6. D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727 (2002).
7. An in-depth discussion of the science behind fMRI is beyond the scope of this Paper. For
a good introduction, see SCOTT A. HUETTEL, ALLEN W. SONG & GREGORY MCCARTHY,
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1–23 (2d ed. 2009).
8. Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 729.
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traditionally employs “yes” or “no” questions). The basic principle behind
the GKT is that the subject will have an elevated physiological reaction to
the correct answer. Such a response suggests that the subject recognizes the
correct answer and, therefore, possesses knowledge of the crime. 9
In this early fMRI deception study, participants were asked to choose
one of three sealed envelopes and memorize the card inside. 10 Each envelope contained a twenty-dollar bill and a five of clubs playing card. The
participants were told that they could keep the twenty dollars if they concealed the identity of the card in the envelope from the “computer.”11 Participants were then placed inside the fMRI machine whereupon they were
shown images of various playing cards. For each image, participants were
instructed to press one of two buttons to indicate whether the card shown
matched the card in the envelope.
The researchers hypothesized that they would be able to detect and localize a difference in brain activity between lies and truths. After averaging
the data from eighteen participants, they found that two brain regions
showed increased activation when subjects were lying. 12
The preceding study used group analysis, which means that the data
from each participant’s scan were averaged together and analyzed as a
group. Accordingly, a study using group data analysis might reveal increased activation in a particular brain region even if that region was not activated in every subject.
From a legal standpoint, group studies are not especially useful. After
all, the law is not interested in patterns of neural activity across subjects.
Rather, judges and jurors want to know whether a particular individual is
lying or telling the truth. Nevertheless, group studies may provide something like a blueprint of the pattern of neural activity associated with deception. If so, a neuroscientist could scan an individual subject and then compare his pattern of brain activity against the averaged results from a group
of subjects. If the individual’s results were sufficiently similar to that of the
group, one could reasonably infer whether he was lying or telling the truth.
One study that used the group analysis method also employed a modified version of the GKT. Investigators began by collecting group data.
They then developed a model that could analyze individual data and indicate whether a single person was being truthful or deceitful based on the

9. See David T. Lykken, Why (Some) Americans Believe in the Lie Detector While Others
Believe in the Guilty Knowledge Test, 26 INTEGR. PHYSIOL. BEHAV. SCI. 214 (1991).
10. Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 729.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 730.
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patterns of activation present in the group data. Researchers found that the
model was able to classify seventy-eight percent of responses accurately. 13
B. Shortcomings of Current Research
One of the biggest challenges facing fMRI deception research is the
need for experimental designs that are ecologically valid (i.e., study designs
that approximate real-world scenarios). Several researchers have attempted
to improve upon the ecological validity of previous work by having participants engage in mock crimes. For example, in one experiment, “subjects
were taken to a specific room and instructed to ‘steal’ either a watch or a
ring located in a drawer . . . and place the ‘stolen’ object in a locker along
with their other belongings.” 14 Participants were then scanned while responding to visually presented questions. The participants were instructed
to deny taking either object but to answer neutral and control questions as
honestly and accurately as possible. To motivate participants to do their
best, the researchers informed them that they would receive an additional
fifty dollars if the fMRI investigator could not decipher when they were lying.
An initial group of subjects was scanned and their data was used to
develop analysis methods for determining when a response was a lie. These
methods were then applied to a second group of participants to identify
when they were lying. The investigators were quite successful in differentiating truthful responses from lies. In ninety percent of the cases, the researchers correctly identified the stolen object. 15
Further attesting to the ecological validity of this experiment is the fact
that, in a post-experiment survey, eighty percent of the participants stated
“that they believed that they were participating in a crime.” 16 Additionally,
many of the participants performed countermeasures in an effort to trick the
fMRI. Such actions included “pretending they did not take the object, imagining a specific place, altering breathing, or delaying response.”17 Notably, none of these countermeasures reduced the ability of the investigators
to correctly determine the stolen object.18 These results suggest that fMRI

13. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast EventRelated fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 267 (2005).
14. F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance, 58
BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 605, 606 (2005).
15. Id. at 610. Given this study’s high accuracy rate, it is worth noting that it was largely
funded by Cephos, one of the leading companies in developing a commercially available fMRI
test for lie detection. Id. at 612.
16. Id. at 611.
17. Id. at 611–12.
18. Id.
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lie detection could be successful against even those criminal defendants
who have strong incentives to fool the machine.
There have been several other attempts to develop ecologically valid
deception scenarios. In one recent study, the researchers adapted the standard GKT to the “real life” scenario of lying on a resume. 19 The experiment
involved a single subject, JG, who was asked questions about items on his
resume. 20 Three of the questions could be independently verified
(KNOWN), and three could not be verified (UNKNOWN). The experiment
was structured such that JG had an incentive to lie on all UNKNOWN
items, and a post-study debriefing confirmed that he had, in fact, lied when
answering questions about those items.
The research team had originally hypothesized that the pattern of brain
activation during the lie responses would be similar to that observed in other studies. This hypothesis turned out to be correct for some of the questions. Specifically, JG’s responses to two of the UNKNOWN questions
could be categorized as lies because they revealed patterns of brain activation normally associated with deception. 21 However, for the third
UNKNOWN question, the experimenters were not able to classify the subject’s answer as a lie because it did not follow the typical prefronto-parietal
pattern. 22 These results are particularly interesting because the pattern of
brain activity associated with the subject’s third answer involved regions of
the brain that had not previously been implicated in deception.23
Although almost every preceding fMRI deception study has reported
fronto-parietal activation, this study indicates that brain activation of that
kind is not a necessary consequence of deception. Although this is only one
finding in one study, it should encourage us to remain cautious when making any claims about the neural correlates of deception. It is very clear
from existing studies that not all individuals have the same pattern of neural
activity when engaging in deception.
Clearly, one of the biggest challenges facing fMRI deception researchers is creating experimental designs that are ecologically valid. Even
though several studies have used experimental designs that better approximate real-life situations, fundamentally, all of these studies involve highly
contrived scenarios.
Unfortunately, designing a truly ecologically valid study is virtually
impossible. Because all studies involving human subjects must comport

19. J.G. Hakun et al., Towards Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 4 SOC.
NEUROSCIENCE 518, 519 (2009).
20. Id. at 520–21.
21. Id. at 522.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 522–24.
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with strict ethical standards, there are clear limitations on the extent to
which experimenters can manipulate participants. In each of the fMRI studies discussed above, all of the participants were aware that their deceptive
acts were sanctioned and were taking place within an experimental setting.
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to design an experiment that
would address these concerns and still receive approval by a university’s
institutional review board.
As Nancy Kanwisher cautions, it is possible that these studies are not
actually investigating the neural correlates of lying. 24 She points out that
giving a false response when one has been instructed to do so is not really a
lie per se. Rather, it is an “instructed falsehood.”25 Therefore, existing
studies can only tell us about the brain activation that occurs during an “instructed falsehood.” This is potentially a major problem. As Kanwisher
observes, it is entirely possible, if not likely, that the pattern of neural activity of an individual who is genuinely lying will be significantly different
than that of an individual who has been instructed to lie. 26
Another concern about the use of fMRI in the legal setting is scanninginduced stress. In experimental studies, fMRI operators aim to minimize
scanning-induced stress. 27 In fact, in the previously mentioned Langleben
study—the first peer-reviewed GKT study—the research team explicitly
states that none of the participants reported symptoms of anxiety before or
after the scanning session. 28 For obvious reasons, this is unlikely to be the
case in a criminal trial where the defendant has been accused of a real crime
and is facing real punishment.
A defendant who has submitted to fMRI scanning in the hopes of exoneration is likely to be extremely anxious. As Kanwisher explains, the individual will be anxious—regardless of whether he is guilty—simply because he is a suspect and faces the possibility of severe punishment. 29
Although experimental participants may have had a financial incentive to
lie, a twenty- or fifty-dollar reward represents a very low stakes situation
compared to a trial where the defendant’s life may hang in the balance.
Since none of the subjects in any of these studies faced any threat of
sanction if their lies were detected, anxiety likely did not affect their neural
activity. Therefore, these studies cannot speak to how anxiety may affect
24. Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What Has Been Shown and What
Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 7, 12–
13 (2009).
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. This minimization of harm is another requirement imposed by institutional review
boards.
28. Langleben et al., supra note 6, at 730.
29. Kanwisher, supra note 24, at 12.
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one’s pattern of brain activity. Given the significant differences between
experimental scenarios and a criminal trial, we cannot expect that the neural
activation pattern of a criminal defendant, who is lying to avoid imprisonment—or possibly capital punishment—will bear a strong resemblance to
the neural activation patterns of research subjects who have been instructed
to lie.
Another shortcoming of existing research is that all individual-subject
studies still indirectly utilize group data. For instance, in the Kozel study
discussed above, the researchers began by scanning one group of participants and using their results to identify clusters of significant brain activity
that could then be used to classify the responses of individual subjects as
either truths or lies. Even when experimenters do not conduct their own
group scans, they still rely upon the work of prior group studies. This was
the case in the resume-deception study, for example. 30
Even though these single-subject studies boast high degrees of accuracy, their methodologies are not sufficiently advanced for use in the legal
setting. This is true for two reasons. First, the number of subjects in both
studies is relatively small (n=26 in the 2005 Langleben study and n=31 in
the Kozel study). From a research perspective, the sample size in these
studies is large enough to provide insight into which brain regions tend to
be active during deception and to use those findings to predict whether another experimental subject is being truthful. However, from a legal perspective, it would be unethical to conclude that a particular defendant is lying simply because his pattern of neural activity is similar to that of a few
dozen experimental subjects.
Second, the participants in each of these studies tend to be extremely
homogenous. In the 2005 Langleben study, all of the participants were
right-handed, healthy, male undergraduate students.31 The Kozel study was
a bit more diverse, but not by much. That sample group consisted of
healthy, unmedicated adults between the ages of eighteen and fifty. 32 In
addition, all of the participants were screened prior to scanning for psychiatric illness and deemed neurologically normal. 33 Given that more than half
of all inmates have a mental illness, 34 this is an especially worrisome gap.
Taken together, existing research suggests that important progress is
being made with respect to understanding the patterns of brain activation
30. Kozel et al., supra note 14, at 608.
31. Langleben et al., supra note 13, at 263.
32. Kozel et al., supra note 14, at 606.
33. It is likely that an individual with a psychiatric disorder such as psychopathy or schizophrenia would produce a very different pattern of neural activity when engaging in deception.
34. DORIS L. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
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associated with deception, as well as predicting when an individual subject
is lying. However, given the many weaknesses of this experimental work,
it is clear that fMRI lie detection is not yet ready for use in the courtroom.
Despite these problems, we should not ignore the legal implications of
neuro lie detection. The rapid progress made in recent years indicates that
the legal admissibility of this technology will likely be a live issue in the
near future. Indeed, neuro lie detection is already being used in other criminal justice systems. For instance, the Indian government has used the
technology to investigate more than 150 suspects. 35 Most notably, in a
2008 case in Mumbai, a judge relied almost exclusively on neuro lie detection results when he sentenced a woman to life in prison for murdering her
former fiancé. 36 The fact that neuro lie detection has already been used to
convict people of murder indicates that we should take the constitutional
issues surrounding this technology seriously.
II. THE CURRENT DEBATE: SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 37 The Supreme Court has held that, in order for evidence to fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, it must be (1) incriminating,
(2) testimonial, and (3) compelled.38 Two of these conditions (incrimination and compulsion) are quite easy to identify. In fact, with respect to the
current debate, all scholars agree that forcing a criminal defendant to submit
to neuro lie detection qualifies as a form of compulsion, the purpose of
which is to uncover incriminating evidence. Accordingly, nearly all of the
work on this topic has focused on the testimonial criterion. Although the
question of whether neuro evidence is physical or testimonial has provoked
an interesting debate, we believe the discussion has reached an impasse.
Given the Court’s existing jurisprudence, there is no way to determine
whether the results of neuro lie detection constitute testimonial evidence
and would, therefore, be privileged under the Self-Incrimination Clause.

35. Angela Saini, The Brain Police: Judging Murder with an MRI, WIRED, (May 27, 2009)
http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2009/06/features/guilty.
36. Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
15,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/15brainscan.html?pagewanted=all.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.”).
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The Court first established the physical-testimonial distinction in the
landmark decision of Schmerber v. California. 39 In Schmerber, the defendant, Armando Schmerber, was hospitalized after crashing his car. A police
officer smelled alcohol on Schmerber’s breath and observed other symptoms of drunkenness. At the hospital, the officer placed Schmerber under
arrest and, despite the defendant’s refusal to consent, directed a physician to
take a blood sample. Chemical analysis of the blood indicated intoxication.
Over Schmerber’s objections, a report of the blood work was admitted into
evidence at trial.
The Supreme Court held that the forcible taking of a blood sample
from the accused did not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination because it was not testimonial in nature:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced
communication by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Petitioner’s testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except
as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend
on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither petitioner’s testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible
on privilege grounds. 40
The Court emphasized that the Fifth Amendment protects the accused
from having to “provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature” 41 but permits the State to gather physical evidence from
the accused. 42 With this passage, the Court codified the physicaltestimonial dichotomy that is still in use today. Despite articulating this distinction, the Court failed to adequately define either “physical” or “testimonial.” 43
In fact, in the five decades since Schmerber was decided, the Court has
never laid out a clear test for determining whether evidence is physical or
testimonial. Instead, the Justices have opted to proceed in a case-by-case
manner—making narrow determinations that solve the case at hand but that
39. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
40. Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 761.
42. Id. “The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the
privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.” Id. at
764.
43. Id. at 764 (discussing the physical-testimonial divide, the Court observed that “both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture”).
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provide only minimal guidance for future issues.44 This incremental approach has left gaps in the case law that have led scholars to debate the precise meaning of the terms.
In many circumstances, it is not clear whether evidence is “testimonial” or “physical.” Neuro lie detection evidence is particularly ambiguous
and may be the most difficult case yet. The nature of the technology presents novel challenges to the physical-testimonial divide, straddling the line
in a way that no other type of evidence ever has. Is a device that detects
blood flow within a person’s brain extracting physical or testimonial evidence from the individual? Is tracking blood flow patterns in a person’s
brain meaningfully different than extracting blood from his arm? Is it relevant that the blood flow patterns reveal information that could previously be
acquired only by interrogating the accused? Scholars have examined these
sorts of questions at length in an effort to draw analogies between neuro lie
detection and more traditional forms of evidence.45
Unfortunately, this debate has played out to a draw. Both sides—those
who believe neuro lie detection evidence is physical and those who believe
it is testimonial—have advanced compelling arguments that are equally
supported by existing doctrine. At this point, there is a gap in the case law
that only the courts can patch. To see why, consider polygraph tests—the
closest analogue to neuro lie detection.
A standard polygraph test measures and records physiological indicators of stress, including blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and skin conductivity, while an individual responds to a series of questions. The basic principle of polygraph testing is that deceptive answers will yield heightened
physiological responses compared to non-deceptive answers. These physiological responses can then be used to determine whether a defendant is telling the truth or knows facts about a crime that he is unwilling to reveal.
One might be inclined to think that a person’s physiological responses
are just as physical as his blood. After all, when a suspect’s blood is extracted it is analyzed and used to infer his guilt or innocence, in much the
same way that his physiological responses could be used to make judgments
about his involvement in a crime.
Although the Court has never ruled on whether compelling a criminal
defendant to submit to a polygraph test would violate the Fifth Amendment,
44. See, e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973) (holding that handwriting exemplars are physical evidence); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973) (holding that voice
exemplars are physical evidence); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967) (holding that
it is constitutional to compel a suspect to stand in a lineup because that evidence is physical in nature).
45. See generally MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW:
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 161–75 (2013); Nita Farahany,
Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 366–400 (2012).
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it has addressed the matter in dicta. Most notably, in Schmerber, the Court
recognized that the results of polygraph testing straddle the physicaltestimonial divide:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
Amendment. 46
In this passage, the Court indicates that, even though physiological responses are physical in nature, the results of polygraph testing qualify as testimonial because they are designed to “elicit[] responses which are essentially
testimonial.”
At first glance, the Court seems to have solved the neuro lie detection
question. After all, like polygraph tests, neuro lie detection uses physiological changes to determine an individual’s guilt or innocence. However, the
analogy breaks down when one considers that the Supreme Court has held
that testimonial evidence requires a communicative act on the part of the
person seeking to assert the privilege. As the Court wrote in Schmerber:
[T]he Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the person to whom the privilege applies, and we use [the] words [testimonial and communicative] subject to the same limitations. A
nod or head-shake is as much a “testimonial” or “communicative”
act in this sense as are spoken words. But the terms as we use
them do not apply to evidence of acts noncommunicative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege . . . . 47
This footnote shows that the Court is not concerned with whether evidence itself communicates information to the jury. Indeed, if all evidence
that communicated information to jurors were barred, then no evidence
would ever be admissible. Rather, only communicative “acts on the part of
the person to whom the privilege applies” fall within the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. In other words, an individual cannot invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination when a noncommunicative act produces
evidence that in turn communicates facts to the jury. For example, submitting to a blood test constitutes a noncommunicative act because
“[p]etitioner’s testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his
participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test,

46. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
47. Id. at 761 n.5 (emphasis added).
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which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone.” 48 By contrast, nodding one’s head or making a verbal statement constitutes a communicative
act that requires participation.
So, how does this passage from Schmerber inform the Court’s earlier
statement regarding polygraph examinations? Well, it tells us that the results of polygraph exams are privileged because they can only be obtained
through a communicative act by the defendant. Indeed, looked at in this
light, it immediately becomes clear why polygraph tests must be privileged.
A compelled polygraph test automatically violates a suspect’s Fifth
Amendment privilege because it requires the suspect to provide verbal responses, which are then analyzed alongside his physiological responses to
draw inferences about the truthfulness of his statements. The defendant’s
verbal responses are communicative acts even though non-voluntary physiological evidence is being used to verify the truthfulness of the statements.
Neuro lie detection operates differently than a standard polygraph.
Although some forms of neuro lie detection utilize the defendant’s responses, many others do not. Therefore, if the Court adheres to the reasoning in
Schmerber, it will be forced to conclude that certain forms of neuro lie detection are constitutional whereas others are not. To see where the dividing
line falls, consider functional magnetic resonance imaging. Each of the
fMRI studies discussed earlier required the subject to perform a communicative act (normally pressing a button). Under Schmerber, these uses of
fMRI would be testimonial and, therefore, protected. Other neuro lie detection techniques, however, do not require any communicative act on the part
of the defendant. There are even some neuro lie detection designs, such as
Brain Fingerprinting, where the subject never becomes consciously aware
of the stimulus and, therefore, cannot possibly engage in a communicative
act.
Brain Fingerprinting seeks to determine whether information about a
particular event is stored in an individual’s brain. 49 This technique involves
attaching electrodes to an individual’s head to record brain activity. The
person is then shown a series of words or images on a computer screen.
Each visual stimulus appears for only a fraction of a second. Some of the
stimuli concern details of the crime that only the perpetrator (and those involved in the investigation) could know. The images or words that are relevant to the particular crime are called “probes.” The electrodes detect
brainwaves known as “event-related potentials” or ERPs, which measure
the electrical activity of many neurons in response to a particular stimulus.
When a word or image holds special significance to an individual, neural activity generates a blip in the ERP signal called the “P300” because it
48. Id. at 765.
49. See Jonathan Knight, The Truth About Lying, 428 NATURE 692, 692 (2004).
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occurs approximately 300 milliseconds after exposure to a stimulus. For
example, if the suspect stabbed his victim to death, an image of a knife
would elicit a P300, whereas an image of a baseball bat would not. Thus, a
suspect’s neurological response to the probes may indicate that his brain
recognizes stimuli associated with the crime, even if he explicitly disavows
having knowledge of what happened. Insofar as Brain Fingerprinting can
be accomplished without requiring any form of communicative act on the
part of the suspect, it would be constitutionally permissible under
Schmerber.
Although supported by Court doctrine, the conclusion that some forms
of neuro lie detection are permissible when others are not is nonsensical. It
is this realization that has led some scholars to categorize all forms of neuro
evidence as either completely physical or completely testimonial. Henry
Greely and Anthony Wagner—scholars who fall in the physical camp—go
so far as to say that, “[a]n fMRI scan is nothing more than a computer record of radio waves emitted by molecules in the brain. It does not seem like
‘testimony.’” 50
If one follows this analysis to its natural conclusion, then one must accept that even when the defendant is compelled to produce a response, the
results of the neuro lie detection test would not be testimonial because the
suspect’s response is not being used for its testimonial content. Although
the suspect does engage in a communicative act when he answers “yes” or
“no” or presses a button in response to the examiner’s questions, the evidence that is used to determine guilt or innocence—namely the computerized blood flow patterns—is spontaneous and unrelated to any sort of communicative act.
By this analysis, any evidence acquired through neuro lie detection
would be permissible because it is nothing more than a digital record of
brain activity. 51 Although there are reasonable arguments for the view that
neuro lie detection evidence is physical, these interpretations are unnecessarily reductive and miss the inherent testimonial nature of the evidence.
On a technical level, it is true that investigators are only analyzing changes
in blood flow patterns. However, unlike blood or DNA analysis, neuro lie
50. Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 747, 791 (3d ed. 2011).
51. See Benjamin Holley, It’s All In Your Head: Neurotechnological Lie Detection and the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 28 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 15–22 (2009) (arguing that evidence acquired through neurotechnological lie detection or NTLD is physical because it “does not
read thoughts, but merely manifestations of thoughts, which are recorded as electrical waves or
oxygenated blood patterns” or “require a volitional act”); Aaron J. Hurd, Reaching Past Fingertips
with Forensic Neuroimaging—Non-“Testimonial” Evidence Exceeding the Fifth Amendment’s
Grasp, 58 LOY. L. REV. 213, 221–47 (2012) (arguing that neuroimaging evidence is physical because the procedure used to acquire the evidence does not require a deliberate response on the part
of the defendant).
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detection is aimed at analyzing a suspect’s mental content. Surely information that has been forcibly extracted from a person’s mind is “directed to
eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial.” 52 Furthermore, treating all neuro evidence as physical is untenable because it would strip too
much protection from the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, categorizing neuro
evidence in this manner would essentially obliterate the Self-Incrimination
Clause. After all, where is the benefit in the right to refuse to take the stand
if the government can simply force you to answer all of its questions via a
neuro lie detection test?
So far, we have presented two solutions to the physical-testimonial conundrum. The first is a hybrid option that treats some forms of neuro evidence as physical and other forms as testimonial. The second treats all
forms of neuro evidence as physical. Both solutions present reasonable arguments; however, they both lead to untenable conclusions. If neither the
hybrid option nor the solely physical option is supportable, then only one
possibility remains: all forms of neuro lie detection evidence are testimonial
and, therefore, protected under the Fifth Amendment. In the remainder of
this Section, we examine this possibility and ultimately conclude that this
solution, too, suffers from serious defects.
Michael Pardo has developed the most comprehensive argument that
evidence acquired through neuro lie detection is testimonial.53 He maintains that testimony is “any evidence that requires reliance by the fact-finder
on the epistemic authority of the defendant.”54 As Pardo explains, in
providing testimony, “speakers typically assert some proposition while (1)
intending the assertion to make an evidentiary contribution to the audience,
and (2) believing the assertion is relevant to a matter that is in dispute for
the audience or for which the audience is otherwise in need [of] evidence.” 55 Towards the end of his article, Pardo addresses lie detectors. He
argues that the results of polygraphs and other lie-detection tests are fundamentally testimonial because they are just “inductive evidence of the defendant’s epistemic state.” 56 As he explains, the evidence gleaned through
52. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
53. See PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 161–75; Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience
Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006) [hereinafter
Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence]; Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of
Testimony, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1023 (2008) [hereinafter Pardo, Self-Incrimination]; see also
Jody C. Barillare, Comment, As Its Next Witness, the State Calls . . . the Defendant: Brain Fingerprinting as “Testimonial” Under the Fifth Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 974 (2006) (arguing that Brain Fingerprinting “elicits testimonial psychological responses that force a suspect to
reveal the contents of his mind and involuntarily disclose incriminating information to the government in violation of the Fifth Amendment”).
54. Pardo, Self-Incrimination, supra note 53, at 1025.
55. Id. at 1036.
56. Id. at 1046.
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a lie-detection test tells us either “(1) that we can or cannot rely on the assertions made by the defendant and for which he has represented himself to
be an authority, or (2) what propositions the defendant would assume authority for and would invite reliance upon, were he to testify truthfully.” 57
By contrast, extracted blood cannot be used to infer the mental state of the
accused. Blood analysis can only provide information that is independent
of the individual’s mental state, such as whether he was intoxicated or
whether his DNA matches that found on the murder weapon. This information can in turn be used to determine whether the accused was driving
while intoxicated or whether he committed the murder. Blood analysis
does not reveal anything about the suspect’s knowledge of a crime.
In another paper, Pardo develops a theory of the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege that specifically considers evidence acquired through
neuroscience technologies. He argues that “the government may not compel for use as evidence the content of a suspect’s propositional attitudes”
when these include “mental states such as beliefs, thoughts, doubts, hopes,
wishes, desires, knowledge, and so on, toward propositions.” 58
Under Pardo’s definition of testimony, neuro lie detection evidence is
testimonial. Even when a suspect is not required to communicate during
the exam, the suspect’s neural activity would enable the fact-finder to determine which propositions the suspect would assume authority for if he
were to testify truthfully. For example, if a particular image generates the
telltale neurological blip, the fact-finder can infer that the suspect would assume authority for a proposition to the effect of “I recognize that individual’s face.” In this way, the fact-finder effectively relies on the suspect’s epistemic authority. Although Pardo recognizes that testimony is usually
accompanied by a communicative act, he does not think that such an act is
necessary for evidence to count as testimony. Rather, evidence is testimonial whenever it provides an inductive link to an individual’s epistemic
state.
We believe that Pardo has mounted the best defense possible for classifying neuro evidence as testimonial. We even believe that he endorses the
optimal policy conclusion—the Fifth Amendment should protect against
any form of compelled neuro lie detection. The problem is that Pardo’s position is difficult to square with existing case law. The Court has long emphasized that testimony necessarily involves an act on the part of the indi57. Id.
58. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, supra note 53, at 330. Further elaborating on the extent
of the privilege, Pardo maintains that “the privilege would not preclude compelled tests when used
for any purpose other than those that rely on incriminating propositional content. For example, if
the tests could be used to determine mental capacity, intent, bias, voluntariness, etc., without relying on incriminating propositional content, then the privilege would not preclude such uses.” Id.
at 332 n.205.
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vidual asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. 59 In light of these emerging technologies, the Court may need to reconsider this condition. Until it
does, Pardo’s account cannot find firm support in Supreme Court precedent.
As we have already discussed, the connection between testimony and
communicative action dates back to Schmerber. One line from that opinion
bears repeating: “the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the
person to whom the privilege applies.” This stipulation has played an important role in several more recent cases.
In the 1981 decision Estelle v. Smith, 60 the Court ordered an in-custody
psychiatric examination of the defendant to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. During a capital-sentencing proceeding, the examining
doctor testified that the defendant was “a very severe sociopath” who would
“continue his previous behavior” and that his condition would “only get
worse.” 61 The doctor further emphasized that the defendant had “no remorse or sorrow” for his actions. 62 The question before the Court was
whether admission of the psychiatrist’s damaging testimony violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the
defendant was not apprised of his Miranda rights prior to the exam. In delineating the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court explained
that an individual’s right is not violated so long as “the evidence given by a
defendant is neither related to some communicative act nor used for the testimonial content of what was said.” 63
At first, this line seems to suggest that evidence constitutes testimony
if it meets one of two distinct conditions: (1) it is related to some “communicative act” or (2) it is used for its “testimonial content.” If this was the
Court’s holding, it would provide strong support for Pardo’s account.
However, the Court was not drawing a distinction between the two conditions. Rather, it was equating them. Evidence derived from the “testimonial content of what was said” is necessarily evidence that is also “related to
some communicative act.” In this case, the communicative act is speaking.
In other words, the qualifier “testimonial” necessarily implies some sort of
act on the part of an individual.
Specifically, in Estelle, the Court ruled that admission of the psychiatrist’s testimony into evidence violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege on grounds that:
Dr. Grigson’s diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not
based simply on his observation of respondent. Rather, Dr.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Farahany, supra note 45, at 389–90.
451 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 463.
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Grigson drew his conclusions largely from respondent’s account
of the crime during their interview, and he placed particular emphasis on what he considered to be respondent’s lack of remorse.
Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting
the details of the crime. The Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, is directly involved here because the State used as evidence
against respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination. 64
The necessary link between testimonial content and communicative
action is further enforced by subsequent cases. Nine years after Estelle, in
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 65 the Court was asked to decide which, if any, of a
defendant’s incriminating utterances and actions were testimonial.66 The
case concerned an individual, Muniz, who was pulled over for suspected
drunk driving and was asked to perform three field sobriety tests. Muniz
performed these tests poorly and made incriminating remarks during the
process. 67 He was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
taken to the police station for booking. The defendant was not apprised of
his Miranda rights during the arrest or at the booking station. However, he
was informed that he would be videotaped and audio-recorded.
Police asked the defendant a number of identifying questions, such as
his name, address, height, and age. Although he answered all of the questions, he stumbled over his address and age. The questioning officer then
asked the defendant “Do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?” After the defendant gave an inaudible answer, the officer again
asked, “When you turned six years old, do you remember what the date
was?” The defendant responded that he did not know. 68
As the Court explained, “Muniz’s answer to the sixth birthday question was incriminating, not just because of his delivery, but also because of
his answer’s content; the trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (i.e.,
that he did not know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.” 69
While the State argued that the inference only concerned the physiological
functioning of the defendant’s brain, which is as much “real” or “physical”
evidence as blood, the Court held that the State’s interpretation of the inference “addresses the wrong question; that the ‘fact’ to be inferred might be
said to concern the physical status of Muniz’s brain merely describes the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 464–65 (footnotes and citation omitted).
496 U.S. 582 (1990).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 592.
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way in which the inference is incriminating.” 70 Instead, the Court determined that the right question to be asking in this case “is whether the incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act
or from physical evidence.” 71
The Court’s phrase “testimonial act” clearly indicates that, for Fifth
Amendment purposes, only actions can be testimonial. While an act on the
part of the individual asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege may be a
necessary component of testimony, it is not sufficient. Relying upon Doe v.
United States, 72 the Court maintained that “[u]nless some attempt is made
to secure a communication—written, oral or otherwise—upon which reliance is to be placed as involving [the accused’s] consciousness of the facts
and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him
is not a testimonial one.” 73 In other words, “in order to be testimonial, an
accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” 74
From Muniz, it is clear that the Court has a two-prong standard for determining when evidence is testimonial. First, the evidence must be revealed through an act, which might be verbal, written, or physical (e.g., a
head nod), on the part of the individual asserting the privilege. Second, the
act must be communicative, meaning it must relate a factual assertion or
disclose information.
There is a line of cases, known as the Act of Production Cases, that
further demonstrate that the Court considers the type of act taken by the defendant to be the defining feature of testimony. In Fisher v. United States, 75
the Court addressed the question of whether compelling the production of
tax documents that had been prepared by taxpayers’ accountants and transferred to the taxpayers’ attorneys violated the taxpayers’ Fifth Amendment
privilege. 76 The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege could not
be invoked. 77 The Justices reasoned that the Fifth Amendment only protects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself
and that the taxpayers “retained any privilege they ever had not to be compelled to testify against themselves and not to be compelled themselves to
produce private papers in their possession.” 78

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 593.
Id.
487 U.S. 201 (1988).
Muniz, 496 U.S at 594–95 (quoting Doe, 487 U.S. at 210–11).
Id. at 594 (quoting Doe, 487 U.S. at 210).
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 398.
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The Fisher Court distinguished between the contents of the documents
in question and the act of producing those documents. Quoting Johnson v.
United States, the Court explained, “[a] party is privileged from producing
evidence but not from its production.”79 With respect to the contents of the
documents, the Court acknowledged that while a subpoena requiring a taxpayer to produce an accountant’s documents certainly involves compulsion,
“it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents
sought.” 80 However, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects
of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced” because
“[c]ompliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer” and would
further “indicate the taxpayer’s belief that the papers are those described in
the subpoena.” 81 Nevertheless, the Fisher Court held that the taxpayers
could not invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege on the grounds that:
It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The papers belong to the accountant, were prepared by him, and are the kind usually prepared
by an accountant working on the tax returns of his client. Surely
the Government is in no way relying on the “truthtelling” of the
taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the documents.
The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers. 82
A few months after Fisher, the Court decided Andresen v. Maryland. 83
The central question addressed in this case was whether a person’s Fifth
Amendment privilege is violated by the introduction into evidence of business records seized during a search of his offices.84 As in Fisher, the Court
emphasized the minimal role of the accused in furnishing and authenticating the documents desired by the State. The government’s search for, seizure of, and admission of the documents into evidence did not violate petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege. 85 Echoing Fisher, the Court reasoned

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 399 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411 (citation omitted).
427 U.S. 463 (1976).
Id. at 465.
Id. at 473.
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that the evidence was not testimonial because the “petitioner was not asked
to say or to do anything.” 86 As the Court explained:
The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing. The search for and seizure of these
records were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally,
when these records were introduced at trial, they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not by petitioner. Any compulsion
of petitioner to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present.87
Doe v. United States 88 similarly held that only communicative acts can
be testimonial. 89 In Doe, the question before the Court was whether a petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege is violated by a court order compelling
the petitioner to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts. 90 Notably, authorization did not require the petitioner to identify or
acknowledge the existence of these accounts.
The petitioner, named as John Doe, was the target of a federal grand
jury investigation concerning suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. Doe appeared before a grand jury
regarding a subpoena that directed him to produce records of transactions in
accounts at three named banks in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe
produced some of the bank records and testified that he did not possess or
control additional records responsive to the subpoena. When questioned
about the existence or location of additional records, Doe invoked the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court held that the
petitioner could be compelled to sign the consent directive authorizing foreign banks to disclose his records because it “is not testimonial in nature.” 91
The Court explained that “in order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” 92 The Court concluded that signing a consent directive
does not have testimonial significance because “neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government.” 93
There is a common theme running through the Act of Production Cases: an individual cannot assert his Fifth Amendment privilege unless the

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 201 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 215.
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production of incriminating documents involves an act on the part of the
accused that either (1) relates a factual assertion or (2) discloses information
about the suspect’s knowledge of the documents. The following two cases
further illuminate the importance of these two factors in the Court’s analysis. They provide examples of times the Court did rule that an act of producing documents, but not the content of the documents, had testimonial
significance.
In United States v. Doe (not to be confused with the case Doe v. United States discussed earlier), the Court was asked to rule on whether the
compelled production of business documents owned by, and in the possession of, the respondent was a violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege. 94 The Court held that, although the contents of the subpoenaed
documents were not privileged under the Fifth Amendment, the act of producing the documents was testimonial in nature and was therefore within
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 95 The Court’s reasoning was
that “the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial selfincrimination.” 96
More recently, in United States v. Hubbell, 97 the Court considered
whether compelling the defendant, Hubbell, to disclose the existence of incriminating documents violated his Fifth Amendment privilege when the
government was unable to demonstrate with “reasonable particularity” a
prior awareness either that the documents requested in the subpoena existed
or that they were in the defendant’s possession.98 Echoing its ruling in
Fisher, the Court maintained that the element of compelled testimony “is
not to be found in the contents of the documents produced in response to
the subpoena.” 99 However, unlike in Fisher, the Court here determined that
“the act of producing those documents” was testimonial. 100 The Justices
emphasized the prosecutor’s reliance on the “respondent’s assistance both
to identify potential sources of information and to produce those
sources.” 101
In Fisher, the government “already knew that the documents were in
the attorneys’ possession and could independently confirm their existence
and authenticity through the accountants who created them.” 102 By contrast, in Hubbell, the government was not able to demonstrate “that it had
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606–07 (1984).
Id. at 617.
Id. at 613.
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 41, 45.
Id. at 44–45.
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any prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the
13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent.” 103 Additionally, the Court emphasized the substantial mental effort that the government forced the defendant to undertake. According to the Court, forcing
the defendant to produce the subpoenaed documents was equivalent to forcing him to answer a series of detailed interrogatories about those documents. 104 For this reason, the Court concluded that the defendant’s act of
production was testimonial and, therefore, constitutionally protected.105
Hubbell caps off a long line of cases that show that testimonial content cannot exist without a communicative act. This requirement precludes the
third and final possibility regarding neuro lie detection’s place within the
physical-testimonial dichotomy.
Like the hybrid option, which treats some types of neuro evidence as
physical and other types as testimonial, and the physical option, which
treats all forms of neuro evidence as physical, treating all types of neuro evidence as testimonial also fails. Because not all neuro lie detection tests require a communicative act on the part of the defendant, classifying all of
them as testimonial would be inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine.
Given the Court’s current jurisprudence, neuro lie detection remains unclassifiable. At present, the physical-testimonial division simply cannot accommodate neuro lie detection technologies.
Although the Fifth Amendment debate is currently at an impasse, the
broader question of whether it is constitutional for the government to compel a person to submit to a neuro lie detection test does have an answer. In
Part III, we make progress on this issue by shifting the focus to the Fourth
Amendment. Specifically, we argue that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the compelled use of neuro lie detection because it unconstitutionally violates a person’s mental privacy and the associated right to human dignity.
III. MENTAL PRIVACY AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Imagine the following scenario: The defense calls a key eyewitness to
the stand. During questioning, the witness testifies that the criminal looked
nothing like the defendant and, therefore, the defendant could not possibly
103. Id.
104. Id. at 41–42 (holding that asking the defendant to produce the subpoenaed documents
was “tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a witness to disclose the existence
and location of particular documents fitting certain broad descriptions” or “the functional equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral
questions at a discovery disposition”).
105. Id. at 43 (holding that, since “[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make
extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena,” Hubbell’s act of production is testimonial (quoting Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957))).
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have committed the crime. The prosecutor cross-examines the witness but
is unable to poke holes in her testimony. After concluding the cross examination, the prosecutor moves to compel the witness to take a neuro lie detection test in order to check the truthfulness of her responses. Can the witness assert a constitutional privilege to avoid being forced to submit to the
neuro lie detection test?
Unlike criminal defendants, witnesses generally cannot object on Fifth
Amendment grounds. 106 Therefore, if they are to avoid being compelled to
undergo neuro lie detection tests, they must rely on another constitutional
provision for protection. Fortunately, for them, there is a very clear reason
that neuro lie detection tests are constitutionally inadmissible, and the reason has nothing to do with the Fifth Amendment’s protection against selfincrimination. Rather, it goes to one of the most fundamental constitutional
rights: the guarantee of mental privacy and human dignity enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment. 107
Our argument advances the debate surrounding the constitutionality of
neuro lie detection tests in two key ways. First, it expands the scope of the
discussion beyond criminal defendants. Specifically, we focus on witnesses, a group that has previously not been examined in the context of neuro lie
detection. This lack of discussion is very peculiar insofar as witnesses play
a crucial role in helping judges and jurors uncover the truth. Second, we
sidestep the physical-testimonial question that has divided scholars. 108 If
the constitutional guarantee of human dignity acts as a shield against compelled neuro lie detection tests for witnesses, then it must also protect criminal defendants who, by virtue of their humanity, also have the right of hu106. In the hypothetical, even if that particular witness were involved in the crime and otherwise would have been able to assert her Fifth Amendment right, she waived that right by testifying
in court. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999) (“The privilege is waived
for the matters to which the witness testifies . . . .”).
107. See generally William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992).
108. Other scholars have previously discussed neuroscience-based technologies in the context
of the Fourth Amendment. However, these researchers have limited their investigation to those
times when the technology is used outside of the courtroom and without a warrant. Because our
focus is on criminal defendants who are on trial and witnesses who are subpoenaed to appear before the court, we are raising a different issue. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1274–1303 (2012) (describing four categories of evidence and discussing in
what circumstances a warrantless neurotechnology-based search would be constitutional); Holley,
supra note 51, at 11–13 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment generally protects against the use of
neuroscience-based technologies in the absence of a warrant but that the use of such technologies
would be permissible in places where warrant requirements are relaxed, such as national borders
and airport security checkpoints). But see, Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, supra note 53, at 325
n.163 (“While I understand the intuitions that suggest a probable-cause-plus standard or even an
absolute ban [on the extraction of one’s mental content], the Supreme Court’s precedents suggest
that such a step would be unlikely.”).
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man dignity. By appealing to human dignity, we eliminate the need to categorize neuro evidence as either physical or testimonial.
The phrase “human dignity” appears nowhere in the Constitution.
Nonetheless, its influence is felt throughout the entire document. 109 From
the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee to the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and even to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has held that human
dignity is a fundamental value that underlies many of the Constitution’s
most important protections: 110
[The concept of human dignity] supposes that there are ways of
treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full
member of the human community, and holds that such treatment
is profoundly unjust.
....
It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against
the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right
is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other personal value of like
consequence. It does not make sense otherwise.111
Perhaps nowhere is the manifestation of human dignity more central
than in the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 112 Interestingly, Schmerber is one of the key Supreme Court
cases on the matter. It turns out that scholars were focusing on the right
case. They were simply looking at the wrong part of the opinion. The key
to resolving the constitutional questions about neuro lie detection is found
not in Schmerber’s Fifth Amendment discussion, but rather, in its Fourth
Amendment analysis. 113

109. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 744–56 (2006) (discussing how the Court has treated human dignity
as a core value underlying many constitutional provisions).
110. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“[N]o other approach [than allowing
freedom of expression] would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
250 (1964) (relying on the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of “personal dignity” to uphold
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”).
111. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 697–98 n.9 (1986) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977)).
112. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘expectations of privacy’—the individual’s legitimate expectations that in certain places and at certain
times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.’”) (citation omitted).
113. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–72 (1966).
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After concluding that the defendant could not object on Fifth Amendment grounds to having his blood drawn, the Schmerber Court took up the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited such governmental
action. The Court began by noting that the Fourth Amendment acts as a
complement to the Self-Incrimination Clause. 114 Even if the evidence is
deemed admissible under the Fifth Amendment, the Constitution requires
the Court to take the additional step of determining whether the Fourth
Amendment nonetheless forbids the gathering of such evidence.115
To start its analysis, the Court observed that “[t]he overriding function
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.” 116 Although all Fourth Amendment
cases implicate these values, this is especially true when the search occurs
inside a person’s body. As the Court wrote, doctrine involving the search
of a person’s exterior has “little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface. The interests in human dignity and privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”117
Ultimately, the Court concluded that extracting a person’s blood to determine his blood-alcohol level does not violate his human dignity. The
Court reached this decision on the basis that society does not view blood
tests as an undue imposition upon a person’s privacy and bodily interests.118
Despite this finding, Schmerber reinforced the idea that human dignity
concerns weigh heavily in the Fourth Amendment. As the Court concluded:
It bears repeating . . . that we reach this judgment only on the
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that
the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into
an individual’s body under stringently limited conditions in no
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 119
In Winston v. Lee, 120 the Court again took up this issue. 121 This time,
the question was whether the State could force a criminal defendant to un114. Id. at 768.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 767. This right is “basic to a free society.” Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27 (1949)).
117. Id. at 769–70. “Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body rather than
with state interferences with property relationships or private papers—‘houses, papers, and effects’—we write on a clean slate.” Id. at 767–68.
118. Id. at 771 n.13.
119. Id. at 772.
120. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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dergo surgery to remove a bullet from his collarbone. 122 The Justices reaffirmed Schmerber by holding that certain types of intrusions into a person’s
body are prohibited even though they may produce evidentiary benefits. 123
In Winston, however, the Court went one step further and helped clarify
what types of intrusions are forbidden. Specifically, the Court found that
intrusions which severely violate one’s “dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity” are unconstitutional.124 Following this reasoning, the Court held that compelling the defendant to submit to the surgery is
an unconstitutional intrusion on his privacy interests. 125
Importantly, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all activities that invade a person’s privacy. Instead, there are two
competing interests that must be weighed against each other.126 On the one
side lie the individual’s dignity interests. On the other side lies society’s
interest in accurately determining an individual’s guilt or innocence.
The Court emphasized that the potential bodily harm to the individual
was not the primary basis for the decision.127 Rather, the more fundamental
harm was the fact that compelled surgery would usurp the individual’s own
will and substitute it with the will of the State.128 Relying upon this balancing test, the Court determined that the evidence that could be gathered from
the defendant’s surgery did not outweigh the substantial harm to the defendant’s human dignity. 129 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment barred
the State from compelling the defendant to undergo the surgery.
In other situations, where the intrusion is minor, the State’s interests
can outweigh the defendant’s dignity interests. For example, in Maryland
v. King, 130 the Court ruled that Maryland could swab a suspect’s mouth upon arrest in order to gather a DNA sample that would be used to identify the

121. Id.
122. Id. at 756.
123. Id. at 761.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 766–67 (observing that “the operation sought will intrude substantially on respondent’s protected interests”).
126. Id. at 762.
127. See id. at 763–64 (discussing the uncertainty of the medical risks).
128. See id. at 765. When a patient elects to have surgery:
[T]he surgeon is carrying out the patient’s own will concerning the patient’s body and
the patient’s right to privacy is therefore preserved. In this case, however . . . the
Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent’s body, to ‘drug this citizen—
not yet convicted of a criminal offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of
unconsciousness . . . . This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.
Id. (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 766.
130. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
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suspect. 131 The Court emphasized that such a procedure both fails to offend
a person’s dignity in a meaningful way 132 and facilitates an important police
interest—namely, determining the identity of the suspect.133
Likewise, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 134 the
Court held that the Federal Railroad Administration could constitutionally
require breath, blood, and urine drug tests for railroad employees. 135 A majority of the Court found that the government’s interest in promoting public
safety outweighed the privacy intrusions of these drug tests. 136
Not all of the Justices agreed, however. In a dissent, Justices Marshall
and Brennan invoked Schmerber to support their view that “[c]ompelling a
person to submit to the piercing of his skin by a hypodermic needle so that
his blood may be extracted significantly intrudes on the ‘personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State’ against which the
Fourth Amendment protects.” 137 Of note here is that the point of contention
between the majority and the dissent was the degree to which a person’s
dignity is harmed by compulsory drug testing. Whereas the majority affirmed the regulation because they believed the harm to be slight, the dissent would have voided the regulation on the grounds that the intrusion was
substantial.
As these cases show, the Fourth Amendment’s protective power shifts
according to the extent of the human dignity violation. When the violation
is substantial, the Fourth Amendment concern is strong and the search is
almost certain to be ruled unconstitutional. But when the violation is minimal, the Fourth Amendment concern is weak and the search is almost certain to be upheld. 138
We maintain that compelled neuro lie detection is a substantial dignity
violation that triggers Fourth Amendment protection. On a purely physical
level, neuro lie detection is admittedly less invasive than drawing a person’s
blood. In both fMRI and EEG lie detection, no physical device intrudes beyond the body’s surface. Privacy, however, extends beyond the physical
into the mental realm. 139

131. Id.
132. Id. at 1979 (noting that swabbing a person’s mouth “does not increase the indignity already attendant to normal incidents of arrest”).
133. Id. at 1977.
134. 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 624 (maintaining that “the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal”).
137. Id. at 644 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 876 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
139. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (dividing an individual’s “dignitary interests” into “personal privacy and bodily integrity”).
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As the Court observed in Winston v. Lee, intrusions that do no harm to
the individual’s physical person may nonetheless “damage the individual’s
sense of personal privacy and security” and will, therefore, trigger Fourth
Amendment protection. 140 Just as searching a person’s house with a thermal-imaging device or eavesdropping upon a person’s phone conversations
undermines that individual’s privacy interests without invading his bodily
space, 141 so, too, does neuro lie detection infringe upon a person’s right to
privacy in a non-physical manner. 142
In neuro lie detection, a person’s human dignity is violated because her
thoughts and memories are forcibly extracted from her mind. If there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy anywhere, then there is surely a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of one’s mind. Indeed, no place is more private. Forcing an individual to open this domain
to others constitutes a much more fundamental privacy violation than any
the Court has yet encountered. If we permit the State to intrude upon our
thoughts, no domain will be safe from government surveillance.
In any reasonable balancing test, the weight must go in support of preserving mental privacy. Certainly, the government has a substantial interest
in accurately determining guilt or innocence, but individuals have a much
stronger interest in preserving a private mental sphere, free from governmental intervention. In the Kantian sense, this invasion of mental privacy
violates a person’s respect and status as a human being by treating him as a
mere object to be used to further the State’s ends. Specifically, the State is
subverting the will of the individual in order to further its own interests.
This subversion of will is the very action that was deemed unconstitutional
in Winston. 143
As with any constitutional protection, there are tradeoffs. If neuro lie
detection is prohibited, judges and jurors will have less information on
which to base their findings and conclusions. However, to permit otherwise
would be to license the government to invade our mental sphere—the place
where we have the highest possible expectation of privacy. This is a concession not worth making. The guarantee of human dignity is simply too
fundamental to cast aside.144

140. Id. at 762.
141. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–41 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
358–59 (1967).
142. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980); Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–50.
143. See 470 U.S. at 765.
144. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 697–98 n.9 (1986) (“[I]f rights make sense at
all, then the invasion of a relatively important right must be a very serious matter. It means treating a man as less than a man, or as less worthy of concern than other men. The institution of
rights rests on the conviction that this is a grave injustice, and that it is worth paying the incremen-
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IV. CONCLUSION
The science behind neuro lie detection is rapidly advancing. Although
it is not yet reliable enough for use in the courtroom, that day is not far off.
When that time comes, courts will need to determine whether neuro lie detection evidence is constitutionally admissible. To date, the legal scholarship has focused on whether forcing a criminal defendant to undergo a neuro lie detection test would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. We argue that there are two key problems with this
analysis.
First, the Supreme Court case law does not provide a clear answer to
the question. The current understanding of the physical-testimonial divide
is simply incapable of accommodating neuro lie detection. Second, even if
the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment does protect against compelled
neuro lie detection, the protection would only apply to criminal defendants.
It would not prevent witnesses, jurors, or any other individuals from being
forced to submit to neuro lie detection tests. This is problematic because a
compelled neuro lie detection test constitutes a substantial privacy violation
to all citizens, not just criminal defendants.
In this Paper, we stepped back from the Fifth Amendment discourse
and offered an alternative constitutional basis for prohibiting neuro lie detection tests—specifically, the constitutional guarantee of human dignity as
manifested in the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Our argument solves
both of the problems endemic to the Fifth Amendment dispute. Specifically, our theory has strong precedential support in Supreme Court case law,
and it is universally applicable to all persons, not just criminal defendants.

tal cost in social policy or efficiency that is necessary to prevent it.” (quoting RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1977))).

